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1 Introduction
Most Western countries publicly provide some private goods, such as educa-
tion. These goods are financed through taxes and offered to all citizens at
a lower than competitive price and possibly for free. Households can choose
between the public and private supply.
For some of these goods, consumption of the publicly provided good can
be implemented by private provision, while sometimes the two provisions are
mutually exclusive. It is common in the literature to assume that education
belongs to this second group of goods. In a first-best world, consumers
choose the quality of instruction; this is a priori different for each agent. One
drawback of the public school system is that, for equity reasons, all students
at a particular public school (possibly also in a given area/region) receive the
same service regardless of their preferences.
The public service can be congested: resources to finance education are
limited as well as the variety in the educational offer.1 Offering students in-
centives to move to the private sector reduces congestion and can relax public
constraint and increase the decisional space of agents, but the political sup-
port for a high-quality public service might decrease.2 The introduction of
vouchers is one possible way to incentivise people to attend private schools.3
Vouchers have been a topic of discussion in many Western countries in the
last two decades and have been introduced in some of these countries (Chile
1Clearly, public schools are not always congested, but several empirical studies show
that this is the case in several countries (e.g. Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1995),
Kokkelenberg, Dillon, and Christy (2008), Ruggiero (1999), Smet (2001) and Wo¨ssmann
and West (2006)). Other studies, e.g. Lenton (2008), instead find evidence of economies
of scale and of scope in producing education. Often this result is obtained when trans-
portation costs are not taken into account.
2If the quality of a public school increases, the intensity of its support by the people
attending it also increases, but here we consider support in terms of number of voters.
Those moving to the private sector do not have a direct interest in a high-quality public
school.
3Vouchers are a sort of cheque exploitable only for the purchase of private education.
They can be ”universal” (everybody is entitled to receive them) or ”selective” (only a
subset of the population is eligible).
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was one of the first countries to do so, while the Czech Republic one of the
last). The introduction of vouchers has often encountered strong ideological
opposition.4 The aim of this work is to investigate (through a political eco-
nomy model) whether rational, welfare-maximising citizens should agree on
the introduction of vouchers. A voting model seems appropriate to forecast
how a change in the level of taxation and the use of instruments such as
vouchers would be perceived by voters.5
A broad part of the literature concludes that the introduction of vouchers
do not improve welfare or that it encounters the opposition of the majority
of citizens (unless additional concerns, such as peer effects, are introduced).
On the contrary, I show that, at least under some combination of parameters,
their introduction is always beneficial to the majority of society, for which
reason an office-motivated politician should be in favour of their instaura-
tion. I also show that in many cases their introduction can lead to a Pareto
improvement.
Even restricting attention to the political economy of education, the lit-
erature is extensive.6 Part of the recent positive literature on education (in-
cluding my contribution) builds on the notable paper by Epple and Romano
4Concerning the applied and empirical literature on education and on the introduction
of vouchers, see, for instance, Card and Krueger (1992), Filer and Munich (2001), McEwan
and Carnoy (2002) or Chakrabarti (2008).
5I consider people voting directly on the tax financing education, while most modern
Western democracies are indirect. Even if a model of indirect political representation
seems more realistic, I consider it appropriate to use a standard voting model mainly for
one reason: even if citizens vote for a party (and not on policies), parties are elected by
citizens according to their political programme, and, moreover, elected officials need the
support of voters throughout their entire term and should make decisions in agreement
with the majority of citizens. Of course the role of lobbies, pressure groups and citizens
might vary from one country to another; still, I believe that concerning public subsidisation
to education (normally a subject quite followed by the media), a classic voting model is
appropriate. See also Budge (2006).
6Among the first attempts, Stiglitz (1974) is one of the most well known. Other im-
portant contributions come from Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Blomquist and Christi-
ansen (1998), Blomquist and Christiansen (1999), Chen and West (2000), De Fraja (2002),
Gradstein and Justman (2002) and Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006). The Handbook of
the Economics of Education (2006), the International handbook on the economics of edu-
cation (2004) and Gradstein, Justman, and Meier (2005) provide surveys of a consistent
part of the recent literature on the field.
5
(1996). Education is considered mainly as a consumption good,7 agents,
whose type depends on their income, vote on the tax to finance public schools;
differences in consumption are in terms of quality rather than quantity.
Epple and Romano (1996) show that a single crossing condition has to be
imposed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium and identify two alternative
conditions: Slope Rising in Income (SRI) and Slope Decreasing in Income
(SDI).8 Their main result (known as ”ends against the middle”) is that the
richest and poorest households push to reduce the tax, while the middle class
does the opposite. Vouchers are not considered. Under SDI, they conclude
that the median voter is always decisive and that the poorest half of society
forms a coalition facing the richest half.
Chen and West (2000) carry out a positive analysis of the school sys-
tem, using the same model as Epple and Romano (1996). Their aim is to
compare systems with universal, selective and no vouchers under SDI. The
upper threshold for receiving selective vouchers is the median income, and
the voucher value is equal to the (constant) marginal cost of education. The
article concludes that the majority always prefer the no-voucher model to
the universal one, while the decisive voter is indifferent between the selective
and the no-voucher frameworks and there are no welfare differences.
Epple and Romano (1998) consider a universal vouchers model with stu-
dents differing in income and ability. They conclude that the introduction
of vouchers is supported by a majority of voters and followed by a fall in
congestion; all their results rely on the presence of peer effects. The best stu-
dents attend private schools together with the richest ones. Private schools
are attended by either rich or skilled (or both) students. Only a minority of
neither-rich-nor-skilled students remain in public schools, where the quality
drops along with students’ utility. The authors also develop a computational
model, calibrated to existing empirical evidence.
Similarly to Chen andWest (2000), I consider the introduction of selective
vouchers as a possible way to reduce congestion (by reducing the price of
7See Dur and Glazer (2008).
8For more details on these conditions, see footnote 11 and also page 12.
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private education, vouchers might allow some voters to consume it) and to
increase the quality level in the public sector.9 The differences in results with
respect to Chen and West (2000) come from the attributes of the selective
voucher: more people are entitled to use them and the value of vouchers is
equal to the average cost of public school students. The market structure
and the cost function in this model are similar to Epple and Romano (1998).
Agents vote on the tax to finance public school. My model is more gen-
eral than that of Chen and West (2000): I do not require the cost of public
and private education to be the same, nor do I require the marginal cost of a
student to be constant. As in Chen and West (2000), I do not consider peer
effects,10 and I concentrate on the SDI condition; most results are not qualit-
atively affected by this choice and some of them would even be strengthened
assuming SRI.11 Absent vouchers, my model’s results are identical with those
9The reduction of congestion is used to introduce the willingness of some agents to
attend private school through its direct impact on the perceived quality of instruction.
My model’s results could be replicated using a model where public and private education
are horizontally differentiated. Horizontal differentiation can be explained by the fact that
private schools can propose special complementary services (such as religious instruction,
flexible timetables, sport activities) that can be of interest to some agents.
10This assumption certainly simplifies results, but the main reason for excluding peer
effects is different: it is not clear how peer effects operate.
Many (but not all) studies find evidence of positive peer effects among students. For
instance, Zimmerman (2003) finds that peer effects ”are not large but are statistically
significant in many models”, but not in all of them, and that the phenomenon is limited to
verbal proficiency (but not for mathematical proficiency) and only affects some students of
“medium ability”. Burke and Sass (2008) find that the impact of peer effect on students is
not always significant when accounting for peer effects among professors. McEwan (2003)
finds that in Chile peer effects are not significant when adding mothers’ level of education
to the regression.
On top of that, it is unclear if peer effects have an impact on efficiency or if this is only
a matter of redistribution; such as if the average level of instruction in a society increases
when the best students are together instead of being split in classes of bad students.
Note that if ability is not correlated with income, there is no reason to suppose that
students opting out from the public sector implies a change in the average quality of public
school students.
11The SDI (Slope Decreasing in Income) monotonicity condition means that agents’
preferred tax decreases with income.
Many empirical works have tried to determine which of the two assumptions is more
realistic; at present it is still not clear which one is more likely to be so. Among others,
in several papers Epple and Romano suggest that, for education, the hypothesis of Slope
Rising in Income is more appropriated, while Justman supports the opposite assumption.
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in Epple and Romano (1996), which I use as a benchmark. My model shows
that in the extreme case, when the share of public school students attrac-
ted by vouchers exceeds a given threshold, the public sector collapses, and a
minority of the population is worse off. Introducing vouchers always induces
a Pareto improvement in the more realistic case in which public education
continues to exist.
The paper is divided into four sections: Section 2 describes the basic at-
tributes of the model; Section 3 illustrates the voting outcome without vouch-
ers (benchmark case). Section 4 studies the effects of introducing vouchers,
while in Section 5, I analyse the results of the vote over the tax and show
under which conditions selective vouchers induce a Pareto improvement. The
last Section concludes.
2 The model
I consider a model with two normal goods (the numeraire b and educational
services X) whose basic setting is as follows:
1. Public and private schools are mutually exclusive. Subscript P indic-
ates the public sector and R the private sector (e.g. XP and XR are
respectively the qualities of public and private education).
2. The mass of voters is normalised to one. Each voter has a pupil at-
tending school. Voters type depends solely on income ω (with density
function f ; always strictly positive on the support [ωmin, ωmax]). I as-
sume the average income ω =
∫ ωmax
ωmin
ωf(ω)dω to be greater than the
median one (ωmed).
12
The SDI assumption derives from a substitution effect that prevails on the income ef-
fect and vice versa for the SRI assumption. The SRI assumption is more reasonable for
countries where the poorest’s life conditions are dramatically worse than those of other
groups (maybe children do not even attend school so as to work). Thus, education has a
small impact on people’s utility. On the other hand, the SDI assumption might be more
appropriate for countries where poor people are sufficiently rich to be able to profit from
education and consider it as an investment.
12Given the normalisation of population’s size, average and aggregate income coincide.
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3. Voters’ utility function (U(X, b)) is separable and strictly concave in
X.13
4. To incorporate congestion in the model, the school cost function is
convex in the number of students n so that C(X, n) = F + V (n)X,
with V ′(n) ≥ 0 and V ′′(n) ≥ 0.14 In particular, I assume V (n) =
c1n + c2(n)
2, where n is the number of students attending the school;
thus, the cost function is C(X, n) = F + (c1n+ c2(n)
2)X.15
5. In the educational market, the public sector is the dominant firm, while
the private sector is the competitive fringe. The shape of the cost
function is the same for both the public and private sector.
6. Without loss of generality, I consider that only one public institute
is present.16 Each private school student can decide the level of edu-
cational quality to purchase. Low barriers to entry ensure that the
13This assumption is slightly more restrictive than the one ensuring the single crossing
property in Epple and Romano (1996); the subsequent computations are simplified by this
assumption, but the results and insights are not affected by it.
14Concerning congestion, see also footnote 9. The convexity assumption is controversial.
Having an increasing marginal cost is reasonable when we consider the product sold by
schools including complementary services (such as school bus, professors’ office hours,
sport facilities, etc.), buildings (close to each other), etc. because the cost of these services
might be non-linear (especially in the case of capacity constraints). Empirical studies, e.g.,
Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1995), Epple and Romano (1998), Ruggiero (1999), Smet
(2001), Wo¨ssmann and West (2006), Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) and Kokkelenberg,
Dillon, and Christy (2008), seem to support this assumption. Lazear (2001) offers a survey
of the literature on how class’ size matters and under which condition it is correlated with
the quality or cost of education.
15This form of the cost function, showing decreasing returns to scale, is supported by
several empirical studies, e.g., Epple and Romano (1998), Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006),
Kokkelenberg, Dillon, and Christy (2008) and Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1995). It
is important that the cost function not show increasing returns to scale in order to avoid the
complicated scenario in which average cost of public schooling increases if some students
opt out. Differences in results under constant and decreasing returns to scale are minor.
16This is equivalent to the assumption that all public schools have the same number of
students and quality of service. This is possible with perfectly mobile students and the
same budget for each institute (arbitrage effect), even with the presence of idiosyncratic
heterogeneity (e.g., different average wealth) and peer effects (whose analysis is beyond the
scope of this work). Passing from the general cost function Ψ(XP , η) = S+
(
c1η + ψη
2
)
XP
(with η the number of students per institute) with k institutes to this one would be simply
a matter of renaming some variables.
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number of students in each school always adjusts to what is the most
efficient amount (i.e. for each firm i, ni = argmin(
C(X,ni)
ni
)). The qual-
ity of one unit of private education XR is defined in order to normalise
the private sector’s price to one.17
7. Public education is financed via a proportional income tax t paid by
all citizens and chosen through majority voting. Without loss of gener-
ality, I suppose that the government’s budget constraint requires bal-
ancing only ordinary (variable) costs and the proportional income tax
proceeds.18
8. I assume that tax proceeds are first used to finance vouchers. 19 The
remaining resources are equally shared among public school students
(thus, all students attending public school receive the same quality of
education XP ).
9. The value v of vouchers and agents eligible to use them are exogenously
chosen. With nv denoting the number of people using vouchers in
equilibrium, the public cost of vouchers is nvv.
20
17By the free entry assumption, q does not depend on the number of students in the
private sector. Chen and West (2000) arrives at the same conclusion through a generic
technology to produce education showing decreasing returns to scale. Epple and Romano
(1996) do not need to specify the private sector market structure.
18In other words I suppose fixed costs to be covered by ad hoc lump sum taxes. This
can be explained because, since fixed costs are infrequent and huge, thus they might have
to be approved by specific procedures and financed through special public funds. This
assumption does not qualitatively affect results.
19Fixing a minimal expenditure for public schools might imply a higher preferred tax,
but it would not qualitatively affect the outcome. The alternative option (i.e., having total
income shared between vouchers and public school) would imply a much less treatable
model without adding special insights nor being a more realistic assumption.
20It might look arbitrary to have people voting over the tax to finance school but not
over a) the subset of people entitled to receive vouchers or b) the vouchers’ value. This is
not a simplifying assumption; the voting mechanism is intended as a way to predict the
attitude of an ”office-motivated” politician. His or her political appeal depends on his or
her decisions concerning policies that are of particular interest to voters and are not too
technical. It is reasonable to suppose that voters are interested in general policies (such
as the share of GDP devoted to education) while they do not have a defined position on
technical problems (such as the value of the voucher) that require the collection of much
information. Note, for instance, that the Swiss referendum was only on the introduction
10
By Assumption 7, total public (variable) expenditure on education (c1 +
c2np)npXP + nvv must equal tax proceeds tω. Rearranging the budget con-
straint, the quality of public schools is defined by:
XP =
tω − nvv
gnp
(1)
where g = (c1+c2np) is the per-pupil cost of one unit of public education.
Clearly, since XP cannot be negative, we must ensure that tω ≥ nvv.
Households’ behaviour can be summarised as follows:
• the problem of an agent choosing private school is21 maxXR U(XR, b)s.t. b = (1− t)ω −max{XR − v; 0} (2)
His indirect utility can be written (in its reduced form) as UR(X∗R, (1−
t)ω − max{X∗R − v}), where X
∗
R is the optimal level of consumption
of private education. Clearly, since he does not profit from public
education, if he uses vouchers his preferred level of taxation is t = nvv
ω
(the minimum tax to finance them) and otherwise t = 0. His utility is
strictly decreasing with the tax.
• the utility function of an agent of income ω attending public school is
U(XP , b); replacing b with the after tax income and XP with Equation
1, the indirect utility is:
UP
(
tω − nvv
gnp
; (1− t)ω
)
(3)
The preferred level of taxation for this agent is the one that maximises
his utility, i.e. t∗(ω) = argmax
t
UP
(
tω−nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
. From the FOC it is
of vouchers; vouchers’ value and who could profit from them were chosen by politicians.
Future studies could allow us to find the optimal voucher value and the optimal threshold
(in here, I exogenously chose them).
21Remember that the price of private education q has been normalised to 1.
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possible to indirectly determine how the preferred tax of a voter attending
public school changes with his type/income. Since the utility function is
assumed to be separable in its two arguments, we have that ∂t
∗(ω)
∂ω
> 0 (SRI)
if and only if −ω(1− t)UP22 > U
P
2 and
∂t∗(ω)
∂ω
< 0 (SDI) if and only if −ω(1−
t)UP22 < U
P
2 .
22
Both conditions are widely accepted in the literature; I assume that the
SDI assumption holds. This assumption means that the marginal utility
of education is much higher than that of the numeraire for low levels of
consumption, while the opposite is true when an agent is consuming a richer
bundle. As a consequence, richer people are less eager to substitute units of
the numeraire for education.
Each agent chooses between public and private school by comparing the
two possible levels of utility that he can attain. It is possible to identify the
”indifferent voter(s)” ω̂, i.e., the voter(s) having the same utility regardless
of the type of school attended:
UR (X∗R, (1− t)ω −max{X
∗
R − v, 0}) = U
P
(
tω − nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
. (4)
The identity of ω̂ depends on public school quality and thus on the equi-
librium tax t. Since the equilibrium tax depends on the identity of the pivotal
voter ω, it is more precise to denote the indifferent voter by ω̂(ω).
The two following lemmas allow us to conclude that, once we identify the
indifferent voter, all richer agents attend private school and the others attend
public school.23
Lemma 1 In a given interval ω ∈ [α, ϕ] and for α < β < ϕ, if the agent
ω = β prefers the private system so do all those richer than him (i.e., ω ∈
[β, ϕ]).
22Assuming one of the two monotonicity assumptions is necessary to ensure the existence
of an equilibrium. For more details on the SRI and SDI assumptions, see footnote 11 and
also Epple and Romano (1996).
23This is true as long as we compare agents all receiving the voucher or if none of them
receive it.
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Lemma 2 Similarly to the previous lemma, if ω = β prefers the public sys-
tem, so do all the poorer agents (i.e., ω ∈ [α, β]).
The intuition behind those two lemmas is that the choice between public
and private education depends on the marginal rate of substitution between
education and the numeraire good, which is monotone in income. When
an agent is sufficiently rich for private school to be preferable (because the
reduction in consumption of b has minor effects), this is true a fortiori for all
richer agents. Similarly, if an agent prefers public school, then poorer people
prefer it too.
Figure 1: Moving from public to private school: Engel’s and indifference
curves
The indifferent agent can choose between two bundles: attending public
school he can consume more of the numeraire but less education than what
is desirable, and vice versa (see the left part of fig. 1), since even when
attending private school, an agent has nevertheless to pay the tax financing
the public school. From the sketch of the indifference curves,24 one can see
that for an agent with low income (ω < ωˆ) it is preferable to attend public
school (2 ≻ 1). Voter ωˆ is indifferent between public and private instruction
24The line represents the budget constraint and the vertical deviation in correspondence
to the point Xp is due to the fact that agents can always attend public school, and in that
case, he can consume all his disposable income to buy the numeraire; thus, there is a jump
in his consumption.
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(3 ∼ωˆ 4). Finally, for those agents with sufficiently large income (ω > ωˆ),
the point of tangency suggests that the private schooling is preferred.
Before considering the solution of the model, I consider the situation when
vouchers are not available, which is considered as a benchmark to study the
consequences of the introduction of vouchers.
3 The benchmark case (without vouchers)
When vouchers are not available, this model is the same as in Epple and
Romano (1996), except that I do not set the cost function parameters to be
the same for the public and private sectors.25
Equilibrium results for the no-voucher case are denoted by the superscript
nv. Equation 1 becomes Xnvp =
tω
gnvnnvp
and 4 is UR (X∗R, (1− t)ω −X
∗
R) =
UP
(
tω
gnvnnvp
, (1− t)ω
)
.
Figure 2: Preferred tax under SDI and no voucher (linear proxy)
Under the SDI assumption, the median voter is pivotal (ω = ωmed); from
Figure 2 it is intuitive to see why.26 This means that the voting outcome in
the no-voucher case is tnv = t(ωmed); all and only agents with income lower
25For more details and proofs of this section results, the reader can see Epple and
Romano (1996) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1998).
26As the preferences over the tax are weakly decreasing in relation to income, the poorer
households would prefer a higher level of taxation than would the richer ones. Any pro-
posed t < t(ωmed) can be an equilibrium because all households with income ω < ωmed
prefer t(ωmed). Similarly, all tax proposals t > t(ωmed) are defeated by a majority of
voters composed of all agents with income ω ≥ ωmed.
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than the indifferent voter ω̂ attend public school. The number of households
attending public school is:27
nnvp (t
nv) =
∫ ω̂
ωmin
f(ω)dω = F (ω̂) (5)
The only difference compared to Epple and Romano (1996) is that in my
article public and private school prices (respectively g and q) are not assumed
to be the same. All their results concerning the SDI case hold here simply
assuming g = q. On top of that, even when g 6= q, their results are still
qualitatively applicable; only the identity of the indifferent voter will differ.
In particular, with respect to Epple and Romano (1996), if g > q, the quality
of public school is lower, and so is ω̂ (i.e., the indifferent agent between public
and private school is poorer), and the opposite is true for g < p.
In the next sections, these results are used as a benchmark to grasp the
consequences of the introduction of vouchers.
4 Introducing vouchers
The policy maker proposes a voucher of magnitude v = t
nvω
nnvp
to agents with
income below ωvmax = ω̂(t
nv(ωmed)) if they attend a private school.
28 These
two values have been arbitrarily chosen: v is equal to the voucher-absent
average cost of a public school student; the threshold for being eligible for
the voucher program is equivalent to the income of the pivotal agent under
no vouchers. This ensures not to subsidise agents who would attend private
27Agents, in choosing to attend (or not) public school, take nnvp (and thus the quality
of public instruction) as given and consequently vote for the tax level. In equilibrium,
the proportion of voters opting for public services coincides with agents’ expectations.
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998)’s proposition 2 (proving that a value for nnvp always exists
that solves 4 and that this value is unique) holds in this framework. The conditions
under which Glomm and Ravikumar (1998)’s proposition 2 holds are not restrictive: the
cumulative density function F (ω) simply has to be a continuous function increasing in
relation to ω.
28The value of the voucher (exogenously determined) is strictly smaller than the
marginal cost of a student at equilibrium in the case without vouchers, i.e., t
nvω
nnvp
<
(c1+2c2n
nv
p )t
nvω
(c1+c2nnvp )n
nv
p
. This depends on the non-decreasing returns to scale assumption.
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schools without vouchers and it also simplifies comparisons with the no-
voucher framework.
The public budget constraint 1 can be rewritten as
XP =
(
t−
nv
nnvp
tnv
)
ω
gnp
(6)
We can expect some agents entitled to receive a voucher to shift to the
private sector. Moreover, this implies a reduction in congestion, so the quality
of public school might increase, possibly attracting some students previously
attending a private institute.
Since the price of private education is no longer the same for all agents,
it is possible to identify up to two possible indifferent agents: one among
voters receiving vouchers and another within the others.
It is preferable to consider separately the two different groups of agents
[ωmin, ω
v
max] and [ω
v
max, ωmax]. Lemmas 1 and 2 allow us to construct four
(possibly empty) subsets:29 in particular, for each of the two previous groups
of agents, we can have some voters preferring public education and some
preferring the privately provided counterpart.
ω̂L(t) ∈ [ωmin, ω
v
max] is the income level for which
UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R + v) = U
P
(
tω − nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
(7)
while ω̂R(t) ∈ [ω
v
max;ωmax] is such that
UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R) = U
P
(
tω − nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω
)
(8)
The two previous equations mean that ω̂L and ω̂R are the income levels for
which an agent is indifferent between private and public education. Clearly
ω̂L + v ≤ ω̂ ≤ ω̂R.
The two critical levels of income ω̂L and ω̂R can also be seen in Figure
29Later on, I will give the existence conditions for the indifferent agents and thus the
four subsets’ bounds.
16
3, which shows qualitatively how utility changes with income for an agent
attending private or public school, both with and without vouchers. The
quality of public school in the graph is fixed and Xp > X
nv
p .
Figure 3: How utility changes with income
From Figure 3, ω̂L < ω̂ < ω̂R. If the intersection between U
R(ω + v)
and UP (Xp, ω) were to the right with respect to the one between U
R(ω) and
UP (Xnvp , ω), from the graph it is clear that ω̂L would be greater than ω̂. Thus,
it would not belong to the required interval and all agents in [ωmin, ω
v
max]
would attend public school. Likewise, all agents with income greater than
ω̂ prefer to consume private education when UR(ω) and UP (Xp, ω) do not
cross to the right of ω̂.
When both thresholds exist, there are four groups of agents, whose pre-
ferred choice is represented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Intervals and choices
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Having defined ω̂L and ω̂R, it is now possible to precisely define nv and
np.
30 While nv is the number of agents using the voucher at equilibrium, np
is the number of agents attending public school; thus nv =
∫ ω̂(tnv)
ω̂L
f(ω)dω
and
np =
∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω̂R
ω̂(tnv)
f(ω)dω (9)
The following propositions and their corollaries prove that ω̂L and ω̂R
exist; that is, ω̂L ∈ [ωmin, ω
v
max] and ω̂R ∈ [ω
v
max, ωmax].
Proposition 1 For all t ∈ (0, 1) and ω ∈ R++, there always exists a value
for np ∈ (0, 1) for which the number of people willing to attend public school
is equal to the value for np that agents anticipate to solve their maximisation
problem.
Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If, ceteris paribus, the quality of public school increases, the
preferred tax for a given level of income falls. Thus the same pivotal voter
might choose different tax levels according to the framework.
Corollary 1 If Xp > X
nv
p , then t(ωmed) < t
nv(ωmed).
This means that if the median voter is pivotal both with and without
vouchers, the tax burden decreases if with the introduction of vouchers the
quality of public schooling increases. This corollary has an important welfare
implication, since a reduction in t generates an increase in welfare of all
agents, including those who are not attending a public school.
Proposition 3 If ω̂L = ω̂, then ω̂R = ω̂ and we are back to the case without
vouchers. Moreover it cannot be that ω̂L > ω̂.
30Remember that nnvp is the number of people attending public school in the no-voucher
case; defined by equation 5.
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The idea is that an agent who (voucher-absent) prefers to attend a private
school, wishes for a change in behaviour only if the quality of public school
increases, otherwise there would be no reason to move to the public sector.
The number of students attending public school when vouchers are available
is always weakly smaller than in the no-voucher case, i.e., gnp ≤ g
nvnnvp with
strict inequality as long as ω̂L < ω̂. As long as (and only when) ω̂L < ω̂, the
equilibrium is modified by the introduction of vouchers, and in particular,
we observe a reduction in the number of students attending public school.
Proposition 4 ω̂R > ω̂ if and only if XP > Xp: some agents move, after
the introduction of vouchers, from the private to the public sector, only if
the quality of public school increased as a consequence of the change. If
Xp ≤ X
nv
p , then ω̂R = ω̂.
The voting outcome tax can never be higher than the one preferred by
the median voter (his preferred tax is the highest that can be supported by
at least half of the population). Since ω̂R > ω̂ only when Xp > X
nv
p , if
we observe ω̂R > ω̂, the total number of agents attending public school is
necessarily smaller than in the case without vouchers (np < n
nv
p ).
Proposition 5 Public-school-quality at the equilibrium under vouchers is al-
ways greater or equal to the one without vouchers (for a given level of taxa-
tion), i.e., Xp ≥ X
nv
p , with strict inequality when ω̂L < ω̂.
Proof. See the Appendix for the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Combining the result of these propositions, it is possible to conclude
that there are two possible consequences of the introduction of vouchers:
a) they are ineffective, that is ω̂L = ω̂R = ω
v
max (nobody uses vouchers
and the introduction does not affect agents in the economy); b) the richest
people amongst those entitled to use vouchers and the poorest amongst those
who are not eligible both adjust their behaviour: ω̂L < ω
v
max < ω̂R. Those
propositions are used in the next sections in order to compare welfare under
the different possible scenarios.
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5 The vote over the tax
The tax to finance public school is chosen by households through a majority
vote. Different scenarios are possible:31
• the preferred tax is decreasing in income for agents attending public
school (SDI assumption).
• the preferred tax is t = 0 for private school students not using vouchers.
• t = nvv
ω
is the preferred tax of private school students using vouchers;
this is exactly the minimum tax to finance the voucher system.32 With
this level of taxation, strictly lower than the one preferred by any public
school student, public education disappears.
The voting process outcome depends on the distribution of income and
mainly on whether the median voter attends public school. I analyse separ-
ately the cases: i) (Subsection 5.1) where the median voter continues attend-
ing public school even after the introduction of vouchers (ω̂L ≥ ωmed) and
introducing vouchers always induces a Pareto improvement; and ii) (Subsec-
tion 5.2) where the median voter uses the voucher to move to the private
sector (ω̂L < ωmed) and we observe a Pareto improvement only as long as the
public school system does not collapse; otherwise, a minority of the popula-
tion might be worse off.
31Recall that the preferred tax of an agent depends on his choice of public or private
education but also on the opportunity to receive a voucher when choosing the private
school.
32Remember that here voucher size is fixed, so voting for a higher tax would be useless
for them.
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5.1 The median voter attends a public school (ω̂L ≥
ωmed)
Restricting our attention to the case when ω̂L ∈ [ωmed, ω̂),
33 the outcome of
the vote is precisely t = t(ωmed). In fact, all agents with income ω < ωmed
(by definition half of the population) ask for a tax increase with respect to
t = t(ωmed), while all agents with income ω ∈ (ωmed, ωmax] are favourable
to a decrease in the equilibrium tax.34 This means that the median voter
is pivotal. Figure 5 represents agents’ preferred tax in the case of vouchers
when ω̂L ≥ ωmed.
Figure 5: Agents’ preferred tax
Note that, even though the median voter is again decisive, by Proposition
2 his preferred tax level is lower than in the no-voucher case: t(ωmed) <
tnv(ωmed). Moreover the public budget constraint is relaxed and the quality
of public school necessarily increases.35 Part of this effect is offset by the
33If ω̂L = ω̂ (that is, given the utility function, vouchers are not sufficiently attractive,
and in equilibrium, any agent may use them), we are back to the no-voucher, case and the
introduction of vouchers is ineffective (see proposition 3).
34This is due to the SDI assumption and because a portion of the agents with income
ω > ωmed attend private school.
35Since voucher value is lower than the marginal cost of the most expensive public
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arrival of some new students previously attending private school who are
attracted by the higher public school quality; thus, the subset ω ∈ [ω̂, ω̂R]
is non-empty. By Proposition 4 and its corollary, we know that the number
of agents moving from public school is higher than the number of students
moving to it and that the final effect is an increase in the quality of the public
service (financed through tax proceeds net of vouchers expenditure).
From a welfare standpoint, we observe a Pareto improvement. Intuitively,
when vouchers are introduced, the quality of public schools increases, making
public school students better off. Moreover, the tax burden falls, so all
citizens are better off. By the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP),
all agents changing behaviour while the previous bundle is still affordable
must be better off.
To be more rigourous, for ω̂L < ω̂, utility increases for all agents when
introducing vouchers:
• [ωmin, ω̂L]: these agents always opt for public school. The quality of
public school increases (Proposition 5). Since both their disposable
income and the public school quality increase, their utility increases as
well.
• [ω̂L, ω̂]: they move from public to private education and use vouchers.
If they stick to public education, they increase their utility (similarly
to agents in [ωmin; ω̂L]). If they decide to opt out from public school,
by WARP it must be that their utility from attending private school is
even higher.
• (ω̂, ω̂R): The bundle previously consumed is still affordable. If they
modify their choice, by WARP it means that the new bundle is pre-
ferred to the previous one.
• [ω̂R, ωmax]: all the agents in this interval attend private school in both
cases. The price that they pay to attend private school is the same, and
school students, convincing them to consume private education makes the public budget
constraint less binding and increases the quality of the public service.
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the tax decreases. As a consequence, all these households are better off
in the voucher case.
To sum up, when the introduction of vouchers is ineffective (i.e., ω̂L = ω̂ =
ω̂R), agents are indifferent, and when ω̂L ∈ [ωmed, ω̂), the selective voucher
system strictly Pareto dominates the no-voucher system.
5.2 The median voter attends a private school (ω̂L <
ωmed)
According to the density function f(ω), the number of people affected by
the introduction of vouchers (ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂R] ) varies, and so does the num-
ber of agents willing to use vouchers in equilibrium. The consequences of
introducing vouchers depend on how many agents want to move to private
schooling.
If ω̂L(ωmed) < ωmed, the poorest part of the population (which is attending
public school) cannot form a majority coalition. The shift from public to
private induced by vouchers (ceteris paribus) increases the quality of public
service, which attracts a group of voters (ω ∈ [ω, ω̂R]) previously attending a
private school. Two scenarios can occur depending on whether or not those
willing to attend public school make up at least half of the population (i.e.,∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω̂R
ω̂
f(ω)dω ≥ 50%). The value of vouchers and f(ω) jointly
determine which is the relevant scenario.36
Let us define the pivotal voter as
ω =
{
ω ∈ (ω̂, ω̂R] :
∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω
ω̂
f(ω)dω = 50%
}
(10)
where we restrict the existence of ω to the interval (ω̂, ω̂R], to ensure that
36Note that in all Western countries in which vouchers have been introduced, public
school attendance exceeds half of the population. For instance, in Chile, where vouchers’
value was set slightly below the average cost of students attending public school (OECD
(1998)), private school attendance grew from 25% to 39% (Cox and Lemaitre (1999)).
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he is attending a public school.37 Intuitively the income ω represents the
agent whose preferred tax is the ”median preferred-tax”. Agents’ preferred
tax is summarised in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Agents’ preferred tax
The existence of ω implies that a coalition of public school students set
the equilibrium tax and that the group in favour of having no tax does not
influence the vote outcome alone. If any income fulfils the requirements in
Equation 10, the tax is chosen by the group of agents attending private school
and profiting from the voucher (and set to the minimum level to finance
vouchers: t = nvv
ω
).
The equilibrium when the majority of voters attend public school
By construction, ω is pivotal: all agents with income belonging to the interval
[ωmin, ω̂L]∪[ω̂ , ω] (representing half of the population) prefer a tax rate larger
than the one chosen by ω. Agents in [ω̂L, ω̂] and [ω, ω̂R] ask for a lower but
positive tax rate; the remaining (ω > ω̂R) ask for no tax at all. By the SDI
37
∫ ω̂L
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
∫ ω
ω̂
f(ω)dω = 50% is equivalent to
∫ ωmed
ω̂L
f(ω)dω =
∫ ω
ω̂
f(ω)dω.
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assumption, since ω > ωmed, the equilibrium tax decreases with respect to
equilibria in Sections 3 or 5.1.
From Equation 10, ω̂ < ω ≤ ω̂R. By Proposition 4 we can conclude that
quality of public education has necessarily increased and thus that a strict
Pareto improvement occurred.
All agents’ disposable income increases (t(ω) < tnv(ωmed)); agents attend-
ing a private school (i.e., ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂] and ω > ω̂R) are better off with than
without vouchers. The poorest agents (ω < ω̂L) are also better off, since
they pay less in taxes and receive a better public service.
People in ω ∈ [ω̂, ω̂R] could stick to the private market and consume a
better bundle with respect to the one consumed without vouchers (since the
tax decreased); if they move to the public sector, by WARP we can conclude
that they are better off.
All agents being strictly better off, we conclude that in this framework,
the introduction of vouchers leads to a strict Pareto improvement.
The equilibrium when the majority of voters do not attend public
school When agents willing to attend public school amount to less than
50% of the population, the decisive voter belongs to the group of people
attending private school and profiting from the voucher. The minimum tax
to finance vouchers for all agents entitled to receive them (t =
nnvp v
ω
) wins
any pairwise comparison. Replacing v by its value, we obtain t =
nnvp v
ω
= tnv.
Every former student of the public school is receiving the average social cost
of a public student in the no voucher case.
For this solution to be a stable equilibrium, at least half of the population
has to be better off; otherwise, this level tax could not win against the
proposal of having no vouchers. All people with income ω > ω̂ are indifferent,
since the tax does not change with respect to the benchmark.
People with income ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂] are always better off (by WARP).
Concerning people with income ω < ω̂L, they all receive the same voucher
to be spent for private education. Three frameworks are possible for them:
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1. Private school market price (q) is lower than the average cost of produ-
cing public education (AC(XP )) in the no-voucher case. It is socially
optimal to dismantle the public school and distribute vouchers. Agents
are better off; this solution is a Pareto improving equilibrium, and
public schooling disappears.
2. q = AC(XP ). They are indifferent (they consume the same amount of
both goods). This equilibrium weakly Pareto dominates the no-voucher
case and public schooling disappears.
3. q > AC(XP ). They are strictly worse off (they consume the same
quantity of numeraire but receive a worse educational service). Here,
a minority of the population is worse off (ω < ω̂L), another is better
off (ω ∈ [ω̂L, ω̂]) and the remainder (ω > ω̂) is indifferent. For this
framework to be an equilibrium (i.e., for voters to accept the intro-
duction of vouchers), at least half of voters should agree on vouchers,
which means that a substantial part of the richest agents has to form
a coalition with the middle class against the lower class.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this work was to investigate the implications of introducing se-
lective vouchers and in particular if this change would be accepted by the
majority of voters. The main contributions of this work are to show:
1. that the usual conclusion that the median voter is always decisive under
the assumption of SDI is not robust with regard to the introduction of
vouchers.
2. that in addition to the known types of coalition (”lower class versus
higher class” and ”middle class versus the others”), we can have a
third type of coalition where part of the bottom-middle class joins the
coalition of the richest agents to ask for a reduction in taxes while the
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top-middle class forms a coalition with the poorest voters to increase
taxes.
3. that the introduction of vouchers always induces a Pareto improvement
unless if, introducing them, the public sector collapses and meanwhile
the market price of private education is higher than the average cost
of producing public education. In this case the poorest subset of the
population will be hurt by the introduction of vouchers.
4. that the introduction of vouchers should always be supported by a large
majority (under the hypothesis of rational agents).38
5. that the middle class is the group that directly profits from vouchers;
the poorest class is the one bearing their costs when a public school
collapses. The richest class always weakly profits from the introduction
of vouchers (through tax reductions).
My model is qualitatively robust to different specifications (such as Con-
stant Return to Scale production functions) as long as we choose the value of
the voucher that is smaller than the cost of public students but large enough
to be attractive for some students.
From the results, it is possible to conclude that the introduction of vouch-
ers should never be harmful for society (unless it produces the collapse of
public schools) when its value is below or equal to the average per-student
public expenditure and when it does not subsidise students that would have
attended a private school in any case. Of course, this result depends on the
initial specifications, which should be reiterated: 1) education is considered
a horizontally differentiated good, and it is not harmful for society to have
people attending the school of their choice.39 2) the role of peer effects is
not significant; (alternatively, peer effects have a linear impact on instruction
and the social welfare function is utilitarian).
38The majority of voters always profit from the introduction of vouchers; in most cases,
all agents in the society do.
39If in a country, for instance, a school were less effective in the spread of knowledge,
increasing its market share might have a negative impact on productivity, growth, etc.
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Note that introducing selective vouchers of a fixed amount implies a jump
in utility (thus a distortion) for agents having an income close to the threshold
to be eligible. This is a structural problem of selective vouchers that can
be avoided by introducing vouchers that are regressive in income. Further
studies might find under which conditions such vouchers would be compatible
with public budget constraint and allow an increase in welfare.
From these results, we also conclude that the introduction of vouchers
would increase integration in a stratified society, increasing the variance in
wealth amongst students in the same school (making private schools access-
ible to poorer people and public schools more attractive for richer people).
From these results, one might expect that the introduction of vouch-
ers would be welcomed by voters; nevertheless in many Western countries
(especially in Europe), vouchers are not very popular. In Switzerland, a
referendum against vouchers was successful in the Canton Ticino region; in
Italy the debate over vouchers was almost immediately halted because of the
strong hostility shown by many political parties.
A combination of different factors may have generated this aversion to-
wards vouchers: on the one hand, in many countries, private institutes have
religious (and often even political) orientations, and vouchers are perceived
as a way to subsidise a specific credo or as a way to diffuse specific cultures
or principles.
Another reason for the failure of vouchers in Europe might be that gener-
ally only universal vouchers have been proposed and, which are more likely
to decrease the quality of the public service and reduce redistribution.
Finally, a more substantial problem concerns the value of the voucher.
A voucher of a small amount is ineffective, and a voucher that is too large
implies that the public sector is no longer supported by the majority of
the population. In my model, a benevolent social planner fixes the value
of the voucher at a value at which the public budget constraint is relaxed
when some students use them. If we let people decide the value of vouchers,
we can expect to have different results compared to those of my model; in
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particular, it is possible for the vouchers’ value to be larger than the public
school student’s social cost or so small that nobody would be interested in
using them.
Appendix
A The effects of a change in the tax
Most variables are affected by changes in the income tax. Intuitively, if the
tax rate falls, the first impact on the model is that on the one side the public
investment in education (tω) falls, and, on the other hand, the disposable
income ((1 − t)ω) of all the agents increases. Both these effects imply that
opting for private school becomes more attractive. Concerning the first ef-
fect, the reasons are obvious, while for the second one, they are slightly more
subtle: an increase in the disposable income leads to an increase in the con-
sumption of b for everybody, but since the quantity of b consumed by people
attending public school is higher, by the concavity of the utility function, the
increase in utility for people attending public school is lower than the utility
for those preferring private education. Since private school becomes more
attractive, a greater number of agents switch from the public to the private
system (which means that the income of the two indifferent voters decreases).
The number of voters using vouchers increases, tightening even more the pub-
lic budget constraint. Simultaneously, with the number of people attending
public school having fallen, the per-capita public expenditure increases (since
gnp drops), making public education more attractive.
To summarise, the impact on the quality of public school from a change
in the tax is a priori undetermined. On the one side, a drop in the tax rate
implies that the budget available for public school is lower. On the other side,
this causes a decrease in the number of people attending public school (both
because public school becomes less attractive and because agents’ disposable
income increases). When ∂Xp
∂t
≥ 0, it means that a reduction in the tax
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rate decreases public expenditure for education and the consequent shrinkage
in the number of people attending public school is not enough to offset it
(in other words, demand for public school is inelastic); thus, the per-capita
expenditure will also plunge. The reverse is true for ∂Xp
∂t
< 0.
B Proof of Proposition 1
At equilibrium, np has to solve two equations. On one side, it is equal to
the fraction of agents for whom the utility of attending a public school is
larger than the utility of opting out of it, thus np = µ{ω : U
P (t, ω, ω, np) ≥
UR(t, ω, v), where µ is the probability measure associated with the distribu-
tion function. On the other hand (Equation 9), the number of agents with
income in the interval [ωmin, ω̂L] ∪ [ω̂, ω̂R] must be the same as the value for
np used by agents to solve their maximisation problem.
Equating the two, we obtain µ{ω : UP (t, ω, ω, np) ≥ U
R(t, ω, v) = F (ω̂L)+
(F (ω̂R) − F (ω̂)). Simple computations show that the left-hand side of the
equation is decreasing in both ω̂L and ω̂R while the right-hand side is increas-
ing. Since F is a continuous (and strictly increasing) function and since, for
np = 0, the left-hand side is always larger than the right-hand side, a unique
solution exists (fixed point theorem).
C Proof of Proposition 2
For a given revenue ω˜, the preferred tax t(ω˜) = argmax
t
UP ( tω−nvv
gnp
, (1− t)ω˜).
If, for any reason, the first argument (Xp) increases, its marginal utility
of education (Up1 ) decreases. At equilibrium, the optimal tax by definition
equalises the marginal utility of both arguments (Up1 = U
p
2 ), which means that
the marginal utility of the numeraire falls (thus, the numeraire consumption
has to increase) and thus the tax drops.
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D Proof of Proposition 3
If ω̂L = ω̂, nobody uses the voucher, nv = 0 and Xp =
ωtnv
gnp
. The number of
students attending public school cannot be lower than in equilibrium in the
no-voucher case, which implies that gnp ≥ g
nvnnvp . This makes public school
(weakly) less attractive than in the no-voucher case, so all the households
with income ω > ω̂ (who were already preferring the private system) confirm
their choice. If XR ≻ω XP for all ω > ω̂, then g
nvnnvp = gnp and thus
Xvp = Xp and we are back to the equilibrium case without vouchers.
Finally, it cannot be that ω̂L > ω̂. This would result in nv = 0 and
gvnvp = gnp; this would imply that X
nv
P = XP and thus that ω̂L = ω̂, which
is a contradiction. This proves that ω̂L ≤ ω̂ in all cases.
E Proof of Proposition 4
XP > X
nv
P ⇐ ω̂R > ω̂: if ω̂R > ω̂ , agents in the interval (ω̂, ω̂R) are attending
public school in the presence of vouchers while they were attending private
schools before. The introduction of vouchers does not imply changes in the
disposable income of agents with income above ω̂; thus the original consump-
tion bundle remains affordable. By the WARP, if we observe a change in this
agents’ behaviour, it must be that the new bundle is preferred. Since the
numeraire consumption is constant, it must be that the quality of school
consumed has increased, thus XP > XR > X
nv
P .
XnvP = XP ⇒ ω̂R = ω̂: when X
nv
P = XP , for agents in (ω̂, ωmax] nothing
has changed. By simply replacing XP by X
nv
P in equation 8, we are back
to the condition in equation 4, and thus, by definition, the solution of the
problem is ω̂.
XP > X
nv
P ⇒ ω̂R > ω̂: by definition, ω̂R is the level of income for which
the left- and right-hand sides of Equation 8 are equal. For XnvP = XP ,
ω̂R = ω̂. Increasing XP , public school becomes more attractive (i.e., the
right-hand side is bigger than the left-hand side). Only an increase in the
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level of income can re-establish the equality. Such an increase leads to a
higher consumption of the numeraire both in the case of consumption of
public school and that of private school; given the concavity of the utility
function, the marginal increase is higher on the left-hand side than on the
right-hand side, which ensures that for a sufficiently large increase in ω̂R, the
equality holds once again.
F Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 3, ω̂L cannot be greater than ω̂. Two different scenarios are
possible: ω̂L = ω̂ or ω̂L < ω̂.
Proof by contradiction. Suppose ω̂L < ω̂ and XP ≤ X
nv
P : by Proposition
4, ω̂R = ω̂ and thus a) np = (np(t
nv)−nv), b) ωmed is decisive, c) t > t
nv and
d) g < gnv (since ω̂L < ω̂).
Then [
tnv
gnvnnvp
−
(
t− nv
nnvp
tnv
gnp
)]
ω > 0
a necessary condition for that (since t > tnv) is npg+nvg
nv > nnvp g
nv. For
this to be true it must be that g > gnv which is impossible.
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